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I. INTRODUCTION 
 In the summer of 2008, the United States Supreme Court dropped a jurisprudential 
bombshell in the landmark case, District of Colombia v. Heller.1  For the first time, the Court recognized 
that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to possess firearms for lawful purposes, 
such as the protection of one’s home, that are unconnected with service in a militia.2  What might 
explain the United States’ evolution toward such a position, while other former colonies of the 
United Kingdom are said to have moved steadily in the opposite direction, toward strict gun 
controls?  Is the assertion that the “acorns” of the British tree have fallen in dramatically different 
places accurate?  This Article attempts to test these assumptions and answer these questions through 
analysis of the constitutional systems and historical roots of two of the United States’ common-law 
cousins: Ireland and Australia.   
 Part II of this Article begins with a highly-condensed description of the enactment of a 
constitution in Ireland.  Ireland’s governmental and constitutional structure is then explored, 
focusing on the judiciary.  An examination of the rise and continuation of gun controls in Ireland 
follows, which involves a discussion of the constitutional issues most likely to arise in the context of 
gun control.  Particular emphasis is placed on case law dealing with the Firearms Act of 1925 and 
1964—the primary vehicles for gun control in Ireland.   
 A brief overview of the adoption of a constitution in Australia begins Part III.  An 
introduction to the Australian governmental and court structure follows.  Next comes an account of 
the enactment of stringent gun controls in the mid-1990s, followed by an examination of the 
constitutional concerns with regard to gun control.  The different tests the Australian High Court 
uses to address those concerns concludes Part III.   
                                                
1 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
2 Id. at 2786-7 
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 Part IV analyzes and compares the defining aspects and constitutional implications of each 
country’s approach to gun control. 
 Part V assesses the overall state of gun control in Ireland and Australia and concludes by 
answering two questions:  Is gun control really that different in the United States than in Ireland and 
Australia?  If so, why?  The short answer to the first question is a qualified “yes.”  The unique 
historical, cultural, and constitutional experiences of each country answer the second inquiry. 
II.  IRELAND 
A. The Irish Constitution’s Adoption 
 
Like the United States, Ireland’s first constitution was enacted amidst a whirlwind of 
violence and political upheaval.  Ireland’s struggle for independence from Great Britain did 
culminate in the enactment of a constitution, but also in a division of its territory.  By the early 
twentieth century, a majority of the Irish, through their representatives in the British Parliament, 
successfully voted for home rule in Ireland.3  But the Protestants in the north revolted, fearful of 
becoming a religious minority on a predominantly Catholic island.4  This revolt brought an Irish 
counter-reaction which led to a revolution for independence.5  Eventually, the British and the Irish 
signed the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1921.  The treaty recognized the sovereignty of the twenty-six 
southern counties in Ireland, but with one major catch—the six northern counties were to remain 
under British rule.6  This division was called the “Partition.”  Ireland’s founding document, the 
                                                
3 John Hume, Prospects for Peace in Northern Ireland, 38 ST. LOUIS L.J. 967, 968 (1994). Hume describes this as “autonomy” 
but not “independence.” Id. 
4 Id. at 968. Some Protestants in Northern Ireland still have this fear. See Ian Paisley, Political Viewpoint: Peace Agreement—
or Last Piece in a Sellout Agreement?, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J., 1273, 1284 (1999) (“We are being asked to commit an act of 
collective communal suicide by voting ourselves out of the Union.”). 
5 Hume, supra note 3, at 968. 
6 James T. Kelly, The Empire Strikes Back:  The Taking of Joe Doherty, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 317, 322 (1992). 
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Constitution of the Irish Free State,7 incorporated provisions of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, which was 
replaced in 1937 by the Constitution of Ireland.8   
The Constitution of 1937 claims sovereignty over the whole of Ireland, despite a 1925 
boundary agreement between the Irish Free State, Northern Ireland, and Britain, confirming the 
partition of Northern Ireland.9  The Irish Constitution also states that every person born in Ireland, 
north or south, is an Irish citizen.10  Furthermore, despite the island’s contentious religious history, 
the preamble to the Irish Constitution does not shy away from its religious commitments: “We, the 
people of Éire . . . acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine Lord, Jesus Christ, Who sustained 
our fathers through centuries of trial . . . Do hereby adopt, enact, and give to ourselves this 
Constitution.”11 
In 1949, the Irish Free State declared itself the Republic of Ireland, a state independent in all 
respects from the British Commonwealth.12  But, the north remained a part of the British 
Commonwealth.13  The tensions also remained.  According to a former member of the Northern 
Ireland Parliament speaking in 1994, “the last twenty-five years have in many ways been the worst 
twenty-five years of violence in our history.”14   
 On Good Friday, April 10, 1998, under the patient negotiation techniques of George 
Mitchell, the political parties in Ireland signed a peace agreement.15  Sinn Fein reiterated its former 
                                                
7 CONSTITUTION OF THE IRISH FREE STATE (1922). 
8 BUNREACHT NAH ÉIREANN [Constitution].   
9 Kelly, supra note 6 at 322. The Irish Constitution’s claim of sovereignty over Northern Ireland is seen as spurious by 
some, See Paisley, supra note 4, at 1288 (arguing that Article 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution “form the basis of Dublin’s 
illegal claim”). 
10 BUNREACHT NAH ÉIREANN, See ROBERT KEE, IRELAND, A HISTORY 217 (Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1981). 
11 BUNREACHT NAH ÉIREANN, Preamble. 
12 See Kelly, supra note 6, at 322–23. 
13 See id. at 323. 
14 Hume, supra note 3, at 968.  John Hume, co-founder and leader of Northern Ireland’s Social Democratic Labor Party 
served on the Northern Ireland Parliament from 1979–2001. He states that about one out of every 500 people in 
Northern Ireland has been killed in the conflict and half of those killed have been civilians. Id. 
15 Zachary E. McCabe, Northern Ireland: The Paramilitaries, Terrorism, and September 11th, 30 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 547, 
551 (2002). 
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pledge of a “complete cessation of military activities.”16  The Ulster Defense Association (UDA), the 
largest paramilitary group holding unionist prerogatives, also agreed to the cease-fire.17  The “Good 
Friday Agreement” stipulated in its most relevant part that: (1) Northern Ireland’s constitutional 
status was dependent on the consent of a majority of Northern Ireland’s citizens (as opposed to all 
Irish citizens); (2) the Irish Constitution’s claim to Northern Ireland would be amended to reflect 
the need for consent; and (3) the parties “reaffirm[ed] the commitment to the total disarmament of 
all paramilitary organizations.”18  Time proved, however, that disarming Ireland’s many paramilitary 
groups was a daunting task.19   
In 2006, the Irish and British governments developed and began to implement the St. 
Andrews Agreement, using the Good Friday Agreement as a launching point.20  Under the 
Agreement, all major parties in Ireland consented to support the police and uphold the rule of law.21  
The Agreement also provided for devolution of power away from England toward Belfast.22  At its 
core, the St. Andrews Agreement was a power-sharing agreement.23  Thus far, the Agreement has 
not been shaken by continuing sporadic acts of terrorism in Northern Ireland.24  
 
 
 
                                                
16 Id. (quoting Irish Republican Army Cease-fire Statement, Aug. 31, 1994, available at 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/ira31894.htm). 
17 Id. 
18 Roger Mac Ginty, The Irish Peace Process - Background Briefing by Roger Mac Ginty, available at 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/bac.htm. 
19 See McCabe, supra note 14, at 553–57; Ray Moseley, IRA Keeping Arms, BBC Says, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 12, 1998, § 1, at 4; 
N. Irish Group to Wage Violent Attacks, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Beijing), Dec. 18, 1998. 
20 Agreement at St. Andrews, U.K.-Ir., Oct. 13, 2006, available at http://www.nio.gov.uk/st_andrews_agreement-2.pdf. 
21 Id. § 5–7.  
22 Id. § 13. 
23 Id. § 13 (“[A]ll the parties wish to see devolution restored. It is also clear to us that all parties wish to support policing 
and the rule of law. We hope they will seize this opportunity for bringing the political process in Northern Ireland to 
completion and establishing power-sharing government for the benefit of the whole community.”). 
24 See N. Ireland Leaders Promise to Keep Peace, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Mar. 8, 2009, available at 
http://www.suntimes.com/news/world/1466566,w-northern-ireland-real-ira-attack030809.article. 
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B. Irish Government Structure and the Supreme Court 
 
 The Irish Constitution of 1937 created a three-branch government comprised of an 
executive, a bi-cameral legislature, and an independent judicial branch.  As such, the Irish 
Constitution created a hybrid system of government, combining elements of the United States’ 
presidential system with the United Kingdom’s parliamentary system of governance.25  But in terms 
of its protection of individual rights, the Irish Constitution is much closer to the United States’ 
Constitution than that of the United Kingdom, where the will of the Parliament dominates.26  Article 
34 grants the Supreme Court and the High Court the power of judicial review, a role that 
contributes significantly to the protection of individual rights and serves as a check on the power of 
the Irish Parliament.27 
The Supreme Court also has the power of abstract review.  The Supreme Court can review 
bills and determine whether they are “repugnant” to the Constitution before the Irish President 
signs them into law.28  However, under abstract review procedure, when the President refers a bill 
for review to the Supreme Court and the Court upholds its constitutionality, no court can ever 
review its constitutional status again.29  
The Irish President appoints all judges in Ireland, including those on the Supreme Court.30  
Judges appointed to the Supreme Court may be removed by the legislature for misbehavior or 
incapacity.31  The legislature has the power to determine the jurisdiction of Supreme Court, the age 
                                                
25 Bruce Carolan, The Supreme Court, Constitutional Courts and the Role of International Law in Constitutional Jurisprudence:  The 
Search for Coherence in the use of Foreign Court Judgments by the Supreme Court of Ireland, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 123, 126 
(2004). 
26 Id. 
27 BUNREACHT NAH ÉIREANN, art. 34.3.2. The constitution grants the Irish Supreme Court the final say on all matters 
decided by the High Court. Id. art. 34.4.3. 
28 Id. art. 26.1.1. 
29 Id. art. 34.3.3. 
30 Id. art. 35.1. 
31 Id. art. 35.4.1. 
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of retirement for judges, and the number of judges on the Supreme Court.32  The legislature 
established a nine-member Supreme Court, comprised of a Chief Justice, the president of the High 
Court, and seven ordinary judges.33  Judges sitting on the Supreme Court must retire at age seventy.34  
Judges or the Advocate-General from the Courts of First Instance and the Court of Justice (the 
lowest Irish courts) are qualified for appointment to the Supreme Court, provided they have been a 
practicing barrister for at least twelve years.35  Judges from the Circuit Court (an intermediate court) 
are qualified after sitting on the Circuit Court for four years and are not required to be licensed 
barristers for a minimum period of time before appointment.36 
In 1994, in Heaney v. Ireland the Supreme Court began using a proportionality test to balance 
legislation against individual rights.37  Like other countries employing the proportionality test, the 
Ireland Supreme Court proportionality test proceeds on “the notion that the means chosen to 
pursue a legitimate legislative objective must “impair the right as little as possible.”38  As a common 
law country, the Irish Supreme Court, and the lower Irish courts adhere to the doctrine of stare 
decisis.39  Finally, the Irish Supreme Court has on numerous occasions willingly cited to the United 
States Supreme Court and other foreign courts such as the European Court of Justice.40 
 
 
 
 
                                                
32 Id. art. 36. 
33 Courts and Court Officers Act, 1995, No. 31/1995, § 6 (Ir.) available at 
http://www.bailii.org/ie/legis/num_act/1995/0031.html. 
34 Id. § 47. 
35 Id. § 28(d). 
36 Id. § 28(e). 
37 Heaney v. Ireland [1994] 3 I.R. 593 (H. Ct.).  
38 Brian Foley, The Proportionality Test:  Present Problems, 2008 JUD. STUD. INST. J. 67, 69 (2008). 
39 See Carolan, supra note 24, at 135 (discussing the precedential value of Irish Supreme Court cases).  
40 Id. at 133.  
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C. Gun Control Legislation in Ireland 
1.  Controls under English Rule 
The English Declaration of Rights of 1689, responding to abuses by the English monarch, 
expressed a right to bear arms.  However, the right was not absolute.  Firearms were not available to 
everyone and were certainly not available without precondition.  First, a person only had a right to 
bear firearms when it was “suitable to their Condition.”41  Second, the right was subject to regulation 
by Parliament or “as allowed by law.”42  Third, the right was explicitly limited to Protestants.43   
Britain had a licensing system in place in Ireland under its colonial laws.44  Thus, in 1920, the 
stage was set for the British Parliament to enact gun control laws severely limiting the right to bear 
arms in Ireland as well as England.  Parliament passed “a comprehensive arms control measure that 
effectively repealed the right to be armed by requiring a firearm certificate for anyone wishing to 
‘purchase, possess, use or carry any description of firearm or ammunition for the weapon.’”45  
Britain has readopted the Firearms Act, and it remain in force.46  Since the devolution of power away 
from Westminster toward Belfast, Northern Ireland’s primary statute governing the licensing of 
firearms has been the Firearms Order 1981, promulgated by the Northern Ireland legislature.47 
 
 
 
                                                
41 English Bill of Rights of 1689, art. 7. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 See COLIN GREENWOOD, FIREARMS CONTROL:  A STUDY OF ARMED CRIME AND FIREARMS CONTROL IN ENGLAND 
AND WALES 18 (Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 1972). 
45 JOYCE L. MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS:  THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT 170 (Harvard 
University Press 1994) (citing Firearms Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, ch. 43 (Eng.)). 
46 See Firearms Act, 1968, c. 27 (Eng.). 
47 Firearms Order 1981, 1992 No. 3267(N. Ir.).  The Northern Ireland licensing system reads much like the Republic of 
Ireland’s system.  For a case dealing with the particulars of the Northern Ireland Firearms Order, see In re An Application 
by Chalmers Brown for Judicial Review, [2003] NICA 7 (Civ) (N. Ir.) available at 
http://www.bailii.org/nie/cases/NICA/2003/7.html. 
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2. Controls in the New Irish Republic 
Shortly after gaining autonomy in 1922, the Irish Free State enacted its own firearm licensing 
statutes contained in the Firearms Act of 1925.48  The Act makes it unlawful to possess an 
uncertified firearm.49  Firearm certificates can only be issued by the superintendant of the Garda 
Siochana.50  Certificates are granted by the superintendant only after he is satisfied that an applicant: 
(1) has good reason for requiring the firearm, (2) can possess such firearm without danger to the 
public safety or peace, and (3) is not disentitled to hold a firearm certificate.51   
D. Irish Gun Control Jurisprudence 
There is no mention of an individual right to possess firearms in the Irish Constitution.52  In 
fact, the only mention of firearms in the Irish Constitution appears to disfavor their possession.53  
That there is no constitutional protection for an individual right to bear arms is a fact well-noted by 
the Irish courts.54  Nor does it appear that a significant portion of the public believes there is a right 
to bear arms.55  Although some individuals in Ireland strongly believe there is such a right,56 in 
general, the Irish seem to have negative feelings toward firearms, and appear to view the United 
                                                
48 See Firearms Act of 1925, No. 22/07/1925 (Ir.).  The long title of the Act is as follows: “An Act to place restrictions 
on the possession of firearms and other weapons and ammunition, and for that and other purposes, to amend the law 
relating to firearms and other weapons and ammunition.” 
49 Id. § 2(1). 
50 Id. § 3(1).  “Garda Siochana” is the Irish name for the police force of the Republic of Ireland.  
51 Id. §4.  Disentitled persons include: (1) any person under 16 years old, (2) any person of “intemperate habits,” (3) any 
person of unsound mind, (4) any person sentenced for an offense in which a firearm or firearm imitation was used to 
intimidate or threaten another person within the past five years, (5) any person sentenced to at least three months of 
imprisonment for an assault within the past five years, (6) any person subject to police supervision, and (7) any person 
bound by a court order of good behavior. Firearms Act of 1968 § 17(b). 
52 See BUNREACHT NAH ÉIREANN, art --. Moreover, there is no provision providing for a right of self-defense that might 
arguably justify the possession of firearms. 
53 See BUNREACHT NAH ÉIREANN, art. 40.6.2 (providing for “[t]he right of the citizens to assemble peaceably and 
without arms”). 
54 See, e.g., McCarron v. Kearney, [2008] I.E.H.C. 195 (H. Ct.) available at 
http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2008/H195.html (“There is no constitutional provision providing for any right 
to keep lethal firearms such as that in the Second Amendment to the United States . . . .”). 
55 See, e.g., John Burke, Garda Inspectorate Head Backs Ban on Handgun Ownership, SUNDAY BUSINESS POST (Dublin), Dec. 
28, 2008. 
56 See Stephen Breen, Sick Praise for Recent Slayings, SUNDAY LIFE (Belfast), Mar. 15, 2009 (reporting that an IRA prisoner 
stated: “The right to bear arms in the pursuit of a united Ireland cannot be taken away by anyone and it’s about time the 
people realised this.”). 
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States’ stance on firearms as somewhat foolhardy.57  A surprising sight to an American visitor in 
Ireland might be the fact that the vast majority of their uniformed Garda do not carry firearms.58   
 Despite the fact that there is no express right to bear firearms within the Irish Constitution, 
several parties have successfully challenged a select few firearms regulations and certification 
decisions in the court system.  One avenue has been to challenge directives passed by superiors of 
the superintendants as unjustifiably “fettering the discretion”59 of superintendants in violation of the 
Irish Constitution’s strong commitment to the Irish Legislature’s exclusive power to make law.60  
This is the result of the Irish Supreme Court’s steadfast commitment to separation of powers 
notions.61  Another route has been to challenge a given Garda superintendant’s decision as “so 
illogical and unreasonable” and so “fundamentally at variance with reason and common sense,” that 
the decision is untenable.62  Each avenue is discussed in turn below. 
1.  “Fettering the Discretion” of Superintendants 
In Dunne v. Donohoe, the Irish Supreme Court heard a challenge to a directive set forth by an 
Assistant Commissioner of the Garda Siochana.63  The directive required district officers to ensure 
an applicant had a secure firearms cabinet and satisfactory level of security before granting or 
renewing firearms certificates.64  Martin Dunne had sought renewal of his firearms certificate, but 
                                                
57 See, e.g., John Burke, Garda Inspectorate Head Backs Ban on Handgun Ownership, SUNDAY BUSINESS POST (Dublin), Dec. 
28, 2008 (noting that the head of the Garda Siochana Inspectorate, a former police commissioner in Boston, “would 
‘absolutely’ support a total ban on handguns, based on her experience of murders in the US . . . .”); Denis Staunton, 
Plague of Gun Crime will not be Helped by Supreme Court Ruling, The Irish Times, Jun. 28, 2008 (stating that in “cities like 
Washington and Chicago, which [are] plagued by gun crime, local politicians fear a wave of lawsuits by gun rights 
advocates to remove restrictions, a danger Justice Stephen Breyer highlighted in his dissenting opinion [in Heller]”). 
58 This is pursuant to an Association of Garda Sergeants and Inspectors (AGSI) policy that uniformed Garda are not to 
carry firearms. See generally Valerie Robinson, Arming Gardai ‘Not an Answer to Gun Crime’, IRISH NEWS, Mar. 19, 2008 
(noting the AGSI’s commitment to continuing this policy).  
59 Dunne v. Donohoe, [2002] 2 I.R. 533, available at http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IESC/2002/35.html. 
60 BUNREACHT NAH ÉIREANN, art 15. See Carolan, supra note 25, at 127 (noting that the Irish Supreme Court is willing 
to strike down rather than enjoin government acts that violate the legislature’s exclusive law-making power). 
61 See Carolan, supra note 25, at 127. 
62 O’Leary v. Maher, [2008] I.E.H.C. 113 (H. Ct.) available at http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2008/H113.html. 
63 Dunne, [2002] 2 I.R. 533. 
64 Id. 
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was ordered to install a new firearms cabinet, pursuant to a new directive the Garda superintendant 
was enforcing.65  The directive, entitled “Security Arrangements for Licensed Firearms,” did not 
permit wooden firearms cabinets and required separate storage for the keys to firearms cabinets.66  
Even more stringent requirements applied to rifles with a higher caliber than .22.67  The High Court 
granted relief to Dunne on two grounds: (1) the directive fettered the superintendant’s discretion in 
the exercise of the relevant functions of the Firearms Act of 1925, and (2) the superintendant was 
not empowered to impose a fixed precondition requiring every applicant for a firearm certificate to 
keep the firearms in a locked firearms cabinet constructed in accordance with the requirements of 
the directive.68 
Affirming the High Court, the Supreme Court emphasized the fact that the Oireachtas could 
have granted Garda commissioners the power to enact such directives, but it chose instead to give 
that power only to local Garda superintendants.69  The legislature had conferred the power upon the 
superintendant in Dunne as a “persona designata.”  According to the persona designata doctrine, 
when an individual is granted power, he or she must exercise that power independently from, and 
unconstrained by, any outside authority which seeks to exercise power in concert with the individual 
who has been granted actual authority.70  Therefore, the assistant commissioner of the Garda who 
set forth the directive engaged in unlawful interference under the persona designata doctrine when 
he unilaterally added requirements to the firearms licensing scheme.71  The Supreme Court upheld 
the High Court’s decision to strike down the directive and quash the superintendant’s decision to 
deny the applicant’s application for a firearms certificate.72 
                                                
65 Dunne [2001] I.E.H.C. 126 (H. Ct.) available at http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2001/126.html. 
66 Dunne v. Donohoe, [2002] 2 I.R. 533. 
67 Id. 
68 Dunne v. Donohoe [2001] I.E.H.C. 126 (H. Ct.). 
69 Dunne v. Donohoe, [2002] 2 I.R. 533. “Oireachtas” is the term for the Irish Legislative Assembly.  
70 See Dunne v. Donohoe [2001] I.E.H.C. 126 (H. Ct.) (describing the doctrine’s applicability in Ireland). 
71 Dunne v. Donohoe, [2002] 2 I.R. 533. 
72 Id. 
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2. Separation of Powers Violations 
The Irish Supreme Court also accepted the High Court’s second basis for granting relief to 
Dunne: the separation of powers doctrine.  The court stated that by adding requirements to the 
certification process, the superintendant was acting ultra vires of the provisions of the Firearms Acts 
of 1925 and 1964.73  Neither the commissioners nor the superintendants had been empowered by 
the legislature to impose additional prerequisites for firearm certifications.74  Therefore, by imposing 
additional prerequisites, the superintendant, in essence, assumed the legislature’s power in violation 
of the Constitution’s explicit provision that only the Oireachtas can enact law.75   
The Irish legislature knows how to adapt to the Irish Supreme Court’s rulings.  Four years 
after Dunne, legislators enacted the 2006 Criminal Justice Act.76  The Act codified the requirement 
that a certificate holder have a secure place of storage for the firearm and ammunition, subject to 
inspection by a member of the Garda.77  The Act also vested more power in the Garda hierarchy: 
“The Minister, in consultation with the Commissioner, may by regulations provide for minimum 
standards to be complied with by holders of firearm certificates in relation to the provision of secure 
accommodation for their firearms.”78  
 Not surprisingly, in the wake of the 2006 Criminal Justice Act, courts examining certification 
decisions will often defer to superintendants’ determinations.  For example, following the Act, the 
                                                
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Dunne v. Donohoe, [2002] 2 I.R. 533 .  See BUNREACHT NAH ÉIREANN, art. 15 (“The sole and exclusive power of 
making laws for the State is hereby vested in the Oireachtas”). 
76 Criminal Justice Act of 2006, No. 26/2006 (Ir.) available at 
http://www.oireachtas.ie/documents/bills28/acts/2006/A2606.pdf. 
77 Id. § 32.4(2)(d). The Act also introduced mandatory minimum sentences between five and ten years for certain 
firearms offenses. Id. § 61. 
78 Id. § 32.4(5).  Given Ireland’s strong adherence to the separation of powers doctrine, one might be curious as to 
whether such a delegation of legislative power to executive officers is constitutional.  The Irish Constitution does 
provide, however, that “[p]rovision may be made by law for the creation or recognition of subordinate legislatures and 
for the powers and functions of these legislatures.” BUNREACHT NAH ÉIREANN, art 15. Compare with Bowsher v. Synar, 
748 U.S. 714 (1986) (striking down the Graham–Rudman–Hollings Act because the legislature retained too much 
control over a Comptroller General whom it granted the authority to make budget cut recommendations to the 
President, who was then required to follow the recommendations). 
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High Court showed extreme deference to a Garda superintendant’s decision in McCarron v. Kearney.  
In McCarron, the High Court rejected a challenge to a superintendant’s denial of a firearm certificate 
application on the basis that he was not satisfied that the applicant had a good reason for requiring 
the particular firearm he desired.79  The applicant had attempted to certify a .40 caliber “glock” 
pistol, which he stated he required for target practice.80  The superintendant informed the applicant 
that he considered the glock a combat weapon, and while it might be capable of use for shooting 
targets, it was not suitable for such a use when weighed against the inherent dangers of the 
weapon.81  The court first discussed the effect of the 2006 Criminal Justice Act on the licensing 
system: 
The purpose of licensing is to have control over firearms. It would not be right for 
this Court to construe the Act in such a way that the controls put in place by the 
legislature are abdicated in favour of a test of choice as if a firearm is not a lethal 
weapon and is something other than a most dangerous article. That is what the 
legislation is there to control. It is not within the legislative scheme to issue a firearm 
certificate to any individual simply having a genuine desire to hold a particular 
weapon for sport, no matter what its calibre, the velocity of its projectile or its 
especial killing potential.82 
The court next indicated that the Act made clear that public safety considerations, good 
order of the community, and general proliferation of firearms could enter into a superintendant’s 
individualized certification decision.83  Furthermore, the court stated its version of the burden on 
firearms applications: “the more dangerous the weapon, the greater the burden born by a person 
applying for a firearm certificate to show that he or she has good reason for seeking to possess and 
use that particular weapon.”84   
Interestingly, rather than distinguishing its decision from Dunne—as it likely could have done 
by pointing out that, in this particular case, the superintendant did not act pursuant to a superior’s 
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directive as in Dunne—the McCarron court set forth its own interpretation of Dunne.  First, the court 
stated that interpreting Dunne as a determination that Garda superintendants could not enact their 
own licensing requirements was “an unfortunate misunderstanding.”85  Next, the court stated that 
under a determination of the “public good,” a superintendent could create and adhere to policy it 
considered to advance the “public safety or peace” requirement of the 1925 Act.86  The court 
seemed to imply that if Dunne stood for anything, it was that a superintendant had more discretion, 
not less, to set forth whatever licensing policy he or she desired.87  
 The McCarron court’s holding is questionable.  While Dunne made it clear that a Garda 
superintendant retains control over his own discretion, Dunne also specified that superintendants are 
not vested with the authority to insert their own requirements into the certification calculus.88  To 
the extent that Dunne protected a superintendant’s discretion, it did so from outside influence—the 
court was clear that a superintendant was still not free to promulgate non-statutory certification 
requirements.89  Additionally, it is unclear in McCarron just how the superintendant’s denial of a 
“glock” license can be characterized as a decision appropriately made under the “public” prong of 
the Firearms Act of 1925.  In Dunne, the superintendant’s enforcement of the storage unit 
requirement could just as easily have been defended on the ground that it was for the “public good,” 
but the Court found the superintendant’s actions to be an improper discretionary determination 
anyway.90 
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Contrary to language in McCarron indicating otherwise, the Criminal Justice Act of 2006 did 
not give Garda ministers and superintendants free reign to set licensing policies.91  Under the Act, 
such policy-making power was confined to dealing with the “secure accommodation” of firearms.92   
As discussed below, other judges on the High Court have more carefully abided by the Irish 
Supreme Court’s decision in Dunne, carefully scrutinizing the decisions of Garda superintendants 
and simultaneously balancing the Criminal Justice Act’s changes to gun licensing.  But rather than 
distinguish those cases, the judge in McCarron merely stated, “In so far as my decision in this regard 
differs . . . I find myself unable to follow those decisions.”93   
3. “Illogical and Unreasonable” Licensing Decisions 
A party may challenge a Garda superintendant’s decision as “fundamentally at variance 
with reason and common sense,”94 which is essentially the Irish test for minimum rationality, akin to 
the rational basis test in the United States.  The High Court’s decision in Goodison v. Shehan illustrates 
the principles of this line of judicial review.95  Goodison, like McCarron, dealt with an applicant’s 
challenge to a superintendant’s refusal to issue a certificate on the basis that it presented a danger to 
the safety of the public.96  But in Goodison, the applicant had already been granted licenses for two 
double-barreled shotguns and a rifle.97  Under these circumstances, the court stated:  
There is nothing in [the Firearm Act’s provisions] which entitles the respondent to 
consider the applicant’s suitability in relation to a particular weapon where 
certificates are held in respect of others. Either the applicant is a person who can 
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posses, use or carry a firearm or he is not. In this case he must be seen as a person 
who can.98   
In other words, the superintendant illogically found that the applicant was incapable of holding a 
glock without endangering the public, because the applicant had already been found qualified to 
hold other firearms that were just as deadly.99 
 Under similar circumstances, in O’Leary v. Mahar, the High Court struck down a Garda 
superintendent’s decision to refuse an application for certification of a .308 caliber hunting rifle 
because he considered it a “military caliber weapon.”100  The first problem was that the applicant 
already owned a certified .243 rifle.101  Furthermore, the superintendant informed him that although 
he could not certify his .308 rifle, he would be entitled to certify a 30-06, which, as it turned out, is a 
more powerful firearm.102  The court analyzed the situation stating, “it is difficult to see how one 
rifle is deemed too dangerous to the public . . . to be licensed while the other which is favoured by 
the [superintendant] delivers its rounds at 100 feet per second faster.”103  The court then held that 
“this case is one of those relatively rare cases of judicial review where . . . the decision sought to be 
impugned is so illogical and so unreasonable as to . . .[be] fundamentally at variance with reason and 
common sense.”104 
III. AUSTRALIA 
A.  The Australian Constitution’s Adoption 
Overall, Australia’s move toward independence was a slow and nonviolent process, as 
distinguished from its American and Irish counterparts.  Australia has long been very loyal to 
Britain.  However, despite this loyalty, the Australian colonies began to discuss joining together into 
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a federation in the late nineteenth century.  Although smaller colonies feared a lack of power in a 
new federation, all six states would finally agree to join the federation by enacting a constitution in 
1901.105  Still, Australia remained tied to the British government.  It was not until 1942 that Australia 
would take its next step toward independence.  In 1942, Australia adopted the Statute of 
Westminster, which had been enacted by the English Parliament in 1931. 106  The Statute set out as 
law the constitutional independence of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and other British 
colonies.107  The Statute also granted equal sovereign status to Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand.108  Finally, in 1980, Australia cut all significant ties to Britain by enacting the Australia Act, 
though the Queen of England remains the Australian Head of State.109  The Act also ended all 
constitutional provisions providing for appeal from Australian courts to English courts, and ended 
the inclusion of Acts of the British Parliament into Australian law.110   
B.  Australian Government Structure and the High Court 
Australia’s governmental structure has aptly been described as a “Washminster” system, 
blending parliamentary and presidential aspects into its constitution.111  Similar to the United States’ 
federalist system, the Australian government is divided vertically between a federal government and 
the state government.112  The constitution divides the federal government’s power horizontally into 
an executive, legislative, and judicial branch.113   
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Section 71 of the Australian Constitution vests ultimate judicial authority in a High Court.114  
The High Court has the power to review the constitutionality of laws.115  It does not, however, have 
the power of abstract judicial review like the Irish Supreme Court.  The High Court has a significant 
level of appellate jurisdiction.116  It can hear appeals from the federal courts, and even from the 
highest state courts, on purely state issues.117  The High Court’s jurisdiction over state courts is an 
intriguing fact given Australia’s commitment to federalism. 
Technically the Governor-General, the Queen’s representative in the Parliament and 
ceremonial executive, appoints the High Court Justices.118  In practice, however, the Prime Minister, 
on advice from the Attorney General and Cabinet, appoints Justices.119  The constitution requires a 
minimum of only three Justices to sit on the High Court,120 but the Parliament has provided for a 
Chief Justice and six other Justices.121  The constitution requires no formal legal qualifications for 
Justices, but that he or she already be a judge or have at least five years of experience as a barrister or 
solicitor.122  The constitution requires that High Court Justices retire at age seventy.123 
The High Court strictly adheres to a textualist approach when it interprets constitutional 
powers issues.124  Conversely, when analyzing rights issues, the Australian High Court has “rejected 
any semblance of textualism,” finding rights rooted in the background and purposes of the 
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constitution.125  Beginning the 1990s, the High Court began analyzing rights issues using the doctrine 
of proportionality.126 
C. Gun Control in Australia 
Prior to 1996, gun control was mainly effectuated at the state level by each state, without 
regard to the laws of other states.127  For example, New South Wales enacted the first gun-
registration system in 1802.128  In the 1920s and 1930s, each Australian state jurisdiction enacted its 
own form of firearm registration.129  But each state enacted different registration laws, leading to 
conflicts over which state law, if any, could take preeminence over others.130 
On April 28, 1996, a 28-year-old Australian went on a killing spree in Tasmania, killing 35 
and wounding 21 others in the Port Arthur Massacre, which brought national attention to the 
different gun laws enacted by the states.131  Following the tragedy, then-Prime Minister John Howard 
urged the states to form a coalition and adopt an agreement on firearms.132  Turning to the states for 
help was necessary because Howard’s federal government could not constitutionally enact such 
legislation.133 
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On May 10, 1996, the Australasian Police Ministers’ Council adopted numerous resolutions 
with the goal of more effective firearms control.134  The regulations were designed to ensure uniform 
control of the circulation of firearms.135  Its principle provisions included:  (1) a ban on automatic 
firearms, most semi-automatic firearms, and handguns, (2) the exclusion of the need for self-
protection as a legitimate reason for owning a firearm, (3) a classification scheme based on firearm 
type and need for the firearm,136 (4) mandatory safety training, (5) a 28-day waiting period before 
obtaining a firearm,137 (6) standards for the storage of firearms and (7) the recording of all sales by 
firearms dealers.138  The state governments also provided for a “buyback program” in which the 
government would purchase newly-banned firearms from owners.139  From 1996 to 1997, the 
Australian state governments collected 643,726 prohibited firearms.140  The cost was approximately 
$A320 million, or about $U.S. 230 million.141  
D. Australia Gun Control Jurisprudence & Constitutional Issues 
Australia, like Ireland, has no express provision in its constitution guaranteeing a right to 
bear arms.  In fact, the Australian Constitution contains no bill of rights whatsoever.142  Of course it 
must be remembered that it is possible to have constitutional rights in the absence of written text 
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explicitly providing those rights—constitutionalism is possible even without a constitution.  Because 
of the absence of a textual right to bear arms in Australia’ constitution, the country’s gun advocates 
often argue that their right to bear arms comes from the 1689 English Bill of Rights’ right to bear 
arms provision.143  Although rejected by the High Court, this is not a completely untenable 
position.144  After all, the High Court has recognized a right similar to habeas corpus,145 a freedom of 
expression,146 and a right to vote,147 despite the absence of express text providing those rights.148  
Even so, Australia is properly regarded as having relatively weak individual rights due to the lack of a 
textual foundation.149  Not surprisingly, constitutional issues with regard to gun control in Australia 
have a distinctive flavor of federalism and constitutional powers rather than individual rights issues.  
1.  Federal Gun Controls 
The Australian federal government’s role in gun control is limited primarily to customs 
controls.150  In 1991, the federal government was able to use its customs power to ban importation 
of many semi-automatic weapons.151  The limitations on the federal government in all other areas of 
gun control are the result of the fact that the Australian Constitution contains a Commerce Clause 
which confines the national parliament to acting in interstate commerce.152  Although its level of 
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adherence has ebbed and flowed,153 the Australian High Court has a history of judicial commitment 
to federalism and state sovereignty.154  For example, early in the twentieth century, the Australian 
High Court stated that the parliament could only act in areas which have a “direct, substantial and 
proximate” effect on commerce.155  This was revised in Airlines of NSW Pty Ltd v. NSW (No.2),156 
where the High Court adopted a direct–indirect effect test—a much narrower test than the United 
States Supreme Court’s “significant effect” test.157  In fact, a few members of the High Court 
specifically rejected the United States Supreme Court’s substantial effect test.158  Under the 
Australian High Court’s direct–indirect test, the national legislature’s target must “directly and 
causally” affect interstate commerce.159   
Two cases decided by the Australian High Court dealing with the regulation of air travel 
demonstrate the direct–indirect test.  In the first case, legislation regulating air travel from one state 
to another state (i.e. interstate) was found properly enacted under the Commerce Clause.160  In the 
second case, legislation permitting the federal government to transport passengers by air within a 
state (i.e. intrastate) was found to be beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause, despite the fact that 
such legislation might be conducive “to the efficiency, competitiveness and profitability of . . . 
interstate activity[.]”161   
The narrow test adopted by the Australian High Court means that the Australian Parliament 
has long faced significant barriers to enacting nationwide legislation, barriers felt by the United 
States Congress only when United States v. Lopez struck down legislators’ attempt to regulate firearms 
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near schools.162  Thus, it is widely recognized that any attempts by the Australian Parliament to enact 
national gun control laws would be found unconstitutional.163  
2.  State Gun Controls 
In contrast to the Commerce Clause is the issue of individual state measures that touch or 
“burden” interstate commerce.  In the United States the Dormant Commerce Clause, inferred from 
the Commerce Clause, strikes down state laws which overly burden interstate commerce, thereby 
guarding Congress’ exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce.164  The Australian Constitution, 
unlike the United States Constitution, explicitly provides that “customs, trade, commerce and 
intercourse among the States . . . shall be absolutely free.”165  This has had a similar effect as the 
United States’ Dormant Commerce Clause and has prevented each individual state from enforcing 
their own gun registration laws in other states.166   
Historically, the Australian High Court was very protective of the “complete freedom of 
trade.”167  For example, in Chapman v. Suttie, Victoria attempted to prosecute a Victorian firearms 
dealer who sold guns via mail to buyers in another state who were not registered under the Victoria 
licensing scheme.168  The High Court held that Victoria could not force buyers outside its borders to 
obtain Victoria gun licenses.169  The court quashed the convictions of the firearms dealer and stated 
that imposing an obligation on gun dealers to require a purchaser to produce a Victorian firearm 
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certificate “strikes directly and immediately at the very heart of the trade and must be taken to 
constitute an infringement of s. 92.”170   
Because the current High Court has changed its approach to reviewing § 92 violations, it is 
uncertain whether the holding from Chapman v. Suttie would be upheld today. In Cole v. Whitfield, the 
High Court held that the wording “absolutely free” in § 92 guaranteeing freedom of trade was not 
an absolute freedom from all restrictions on trade.171  The High Court then set forth its test for 
determining whether § 92 had been violated.  First, a law or measure is only invalid if it imposes 
“discriminatory burdens of a protectionist kind.”172  Second, a law or measure can be “saved” if it 
does not have a protectionist purpose and any burden on trade is limited and the approach is 
tailored to the purpose it serves.173 
IV. ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
A. United States  
In the United States, the right to bear arms is now a substantive right.  By any account, Heller 
was a momentous decision in United States constitutional law because it put to rest the long debated 
question of whether the Second Amendment right to bear arms should be treated as protection for 
individuals or a collective right for militias.  It also struck down one of the most restrictive gun 
control laws to ever be attempted in the United States. 
Although it’s full impact is yet to be determined, and the critics are already abound,174 Heller’s 
right to bear arms, which has recently been incorporated to the states,175 will be instrumental in 
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preventing states from “experimenting” with methods of crime control that venture into the spheres 
of home-protection and self-protection, the two best reasons for having a right to bear arms.176  
Unlike the District of Colombia’s outright ban on handguns and stringent trigger-lock requirement, 
most licensing schemes in the United States will likely remain constitutional.  Although Heller was 
novel, it was not actually radical in its result.177  First, it made it clear that the right to bear arms is 
not an absolute right; there are several places, such as in “schools and government buildings,” where 
the government has a stronger interest in prohibiting possession.178  There are also certain persons, 
such as insane persons or felons, who may yet be disqualified from bearing arms.179  Next, it did not 
hold that every weapon, such as “M-15 rifles and the like,” would be allowed.180  The right to bear 
arms extends to only those weapons “in common use at the time.”181   
These limitations on the Second Amendment right to bear arms are consistent with the 
Court’s self-defense and home-protection rationales.  Not every type of gun is needed to protect the 
home and the need to protect one’s home is simply not applicable in several of the areas excused 
from the Court’s holding.  For example, when a person is in a government building or a school, he 
or she obviously does not need to protect his or her home.  The Court’s holding is also well-tailored 
to its self-defense rationale—the limitations on who can bear arms are not likely to undermine this 
rationale in any significant way.  Insane persons or felons are two types of individuals unlikely to use 
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a gun for self-defense in the first place.  In sum, the Court’s decision accomplishes what it sets out 
to do—protecting law-abiding citizens in their homes from governmental experimentation with gun 
controls, while recognizing a limited state role in gun control. 
B. Ireland   
The primary checks on gun control in Ireland come from constitutional structure doctrines.  
Ireland’s separation of powers doctrine is a very powerful tool against gun controls.  Irish case law 
shows that police commissioners are not free to employ whatever policy they desire, but rather must 
only act where the legislature has explicitly granted authority.  This is particularly important in terms 
of the right to bear arms because those most in favor of disarming citizens are most likely to be 
among the police ranks.   
Irish case law also shows a heartening level of judicial examination of each individual 
decision made by licensing authorities.  A licensing decision with even the slightest amount of 
inconsistency or illogic is likely to be overturned by the courts.  Demanding uniform and well-
reasoned decisions from licensing authorities fosters respect for the law. 
On the other hand, the legislature has shown that it has the ability to adapt to the courts.  
Following Dunne, it passed the Criminal Justice Act, reinstating many of the provisions the Supreme 
Court had struck down.  The bad news for individuals in Ireland is that constitutional powers issues 
involve a tug-of-war match in which individuals essentially do none of the tugging.  There is a strong 
argument that relying on the separation of powers and “persona designata” doctrines to limit the 
expansion of gun control in Ireland only has the effect of buying time.   
But while a reasonable mind might believe that the only thing preventing a total ban on 
firearms in Ireland is mere hesitation on the part of the legislature, it would be premature to assume 
that the Irish judiciary would accept such wholesale legislation at face value.  The Irish Supreme 
27 
 
Court has on occasion found that there are certain unenumerated substantive rights held by the Irish 
people.182  Furthermore, it seems doubtful that the Irish, successful in their struggle for 
independence because they were willing to take up arms against their oppressors, would be quick to 
forget that firearms facilitated their struggle for history.  It is also seems doubtful the Irish legislature 
would ignore classic thinkers like Blackstone, who embraced the individual right to bear arms as 
inherent in the common law.183   
On the other hand, it would not be astonishing if Ireland’s bloody experience with domestic 
terrorism eventually drives the country in the opposite direction.  The rate of legislation enacted 
certainly supports the assertion that gun controls are stiffening in Ireland as a result of paramilitary 
activity.   
C.  Australia 
Case law shows that in Australia, the freedom of trade and the Commerce Clause are the 
primary barriers to gun control.  Practically speaking, the freedom of trade does little to help an 
Australian citizen who just wants to keep a gun at home for self-protection.  The freedom of trade 
most likely benefits firearms dealers.  Amongst firearms dealers, the freedom of trade will only be of 
assistance to those selling guns to residents from other states.  Narrowing the window further, the 
freedom of trade is now subject to proportionality review, which is more likely to uphold state 
infringement of individual rights.  Moreover, shielding firearms dealers from government action is 
largely ineffective in advancing the personal self-defense rationale that Heller found so important in 
                                                
182 See Ryan v. The Attorney General [1965] I.R. 294 available at http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IESC/1965/ (“To 
attempt to make a list of all the rights which may properly fall within the category of ‘personal rights’ would be 
difficult”). 
183 See William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book 1 (Oxford 1765-1769) *136–39. Blackstone classified 
“having arms for . . . defense” as one of his five “auxiliary” rights. Id. 
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the United States.  Australian state legislatures have even determined that self-defense is not a 
legitimate reason for owning a firearm.184 
 The Commerce Clause is equally inadequate at protecting firearm ownership.  Although the 
Australian Supreme Court does closely scrutinize national legislation passed pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause, in practice this does little to restrict the expansion of gun controls.  Policing in 
Australia, like the United States, is mainly done at the state level.  Thus, the states are the 
governmental entities most likely to enact gun controls in the first place, not the federal government.  
The federal government is also able to employ its customs power to prevent the imports of many 
firearms into Australia. 
Australia is a case study of the importance of express rights.  Without a bill of rights in the 
Australian Constitution, the courts have been reluctant to extend even the most basic rights.  It was 
not until 1992 that the Australian High Court found an implied freedom of expression in the 
constitution.  Considering the slow evolution of other individual rights, it is not surprising that 
extending a right to bear arms ranks low on the High Court’s priority list.  Australia’s slow evolution 
of rights itself is somewhat of a contradiction to Australia’s strong individualist tradition.  
Considering Australia’s origins as a penal colony, where individual rights were near absolute zero, it 
seems odd that Australians would again allow their liberty to be eclipsed, but that nevertheless 
appears to be the case. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
184 Australian Government Attorney General’s Department: Firearms Regulation: Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/Firearmsregulation_Frequentlyaskedquestions. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The answer to our first question, “Is gun control really that different in the United States 
than in Ireland?” is “no.” 
While a total ban on firearms in Ireland is conceivable, actual gun licensing in Ireland is 
conducted in a manner not unlike many United States licensing schemes left intact even in Heller’s 
wake.185  In fact, most of Ireland’s restrictions on gun ownership are echoed in Heller’s express 
exceptions to the right to bear arms.  For example, Ireland’s gun restrictions on “persons of 
unsound mind” or violent felons are among the exceptions to the right to bear arms outlined in 
Heller. 
History points to strong reasons for similar gun control attitudes in the United States and 
Ireland.  As colonies, both were subjected to serious abuses at the hands of the British government.  
The Irish revolutionaries in the early 1900s, like the American colonists in the 1770s, realized that 
one of the few ways to break their colonial chains was through violence. 
Without any doubt, in Ireland the right to bear arms is not recognized as an esteemed 
individual right in the same sense that it is in the United States.  But even in light of Heller, the actual 
gun controls in place in Ireland do not differ significantly from many schemes left intact in the 
United States.  Gun controls in Ireland pale in comparison to those in England.  Irish case law 
shows that although there is no express constitutional right to bear arms in Ireland, gun control is 
not as free-wheeling as some might contend.  Indeed, this Article has established that there are in 
fact significant constitutional barriers to gun controls in Ireland, although the source of those checks 
is quite different than the source of barriers to gun control in the United States. 
                                                
185 See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816–17 (“nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions 
on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive areas 
such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of 
arms.”). The Court also made clear that this was its non-exhaustive list of “lawful regulatory measures.” Id. at 2817 n.26. 
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The answer to the question:  “Is gun control really that different in the United States than in 
Australia?” is a qualified “yes.”   
Although there remain a considerable number of firearms in Australia, and while the 
limitation on the federal government via its federalism system is noteworthy, gun owners are nearly 
completely exposed to the will of each state government and the local police administrators.  The 
restraints on the state governments through the Australian Constitution’s freedom of trade does 
little for the private citizen who would simply like to keep a firearm at home for self-protection.  
Moreover, in direct contrast to the rationale in Heller, the right of self-defense is not considered a 
legitimate reason for owning a firearm, in any Australian jurisdiction.  It can only be concluded that 
the ability of Australians to bear arms is slight vis-à-vis Americans. 
That finding takes us to our follow-up question:  “Why are gun controls so different in 
Australia?”   
Australia’s position is partially explained by the swell of media calls for the complete 
disarmament of citizens following several mass-shootings over the past two decades.  Though these 
conditions exist to some extent in Ireland, Australia has experienced a sharper increase in such 
events over the past twenty years, spurring the enactment of more gun controls.  Next, the state of 
gun control in Australia is also readily attributable to its lack of a bill of rights. 
Overall, Australia’s divergence from Ireland and the United States is best explained by 
history.  Australia has not had the same tumultuous revolutionary experiences with tyrannical 
government as Ireland and the United States.  Australia had a gradual, peaceful separation from 
Britain, a separation not facilitated by firearms.  It therefore never felt compelled to develop the 
same bond with firearms that the United States and Ireland did.  Perhaps then, to bring this Article’s 
metaphorical title home, Australia is different because it naturally fell from the British tree, whereas 
the United States and Ireland are better characterized as acorns forcibly plucked from the tree. 
